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Abstract
The paper examines the current debates regarding the grounding of human 
rights in a pluralistic, culturally diverse world. It analyses the challenges which 
come today from certain policies of human rights which instrumentalize them 
under the pretext of a “global war on terror” and redefi ne them in terms of 
democracy promotion and regime change, as well as those challenges which 
come from ideologies which question the core principles of human rights 
and provoke the so called “crisis of legitimization.” The paper argues for the 
necessity of restoring the genuine meaning of human rights and of the role 
of citizens in striving for their implementation. At the heart of the analysis is 
Kant’s concept of human rights as freedom. With Kant as its backdrop, the 
paper shows that the claim that religious worldviews provide the only intelligible 
foundation, as in Nicholas Wolterstorff, faces serious challenges in a pluralistic, 
culturally diverse world. The paper then analyzes the non-religious philosophical 
concepts which seek to develop an account of human rights that does not 
depend upon controversial metaphysical or religious doctrines. It examines an 
account of human rights from the perspective of discourse ethics as developed 
by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. It also analyses the concepts of human 
dignity and “emerging morality” by Arturo Roig and the “ethics of liberation” 
by Enrique Dussel. The analysis shows the ongoing relevance of Kant’s ideas and 
their recent development by the theorists of discourse ethics and of dialogical 
and democratic cosmopolitanism. 
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Resumo
O texto examina os debates atuais a respeito da fundamentação dos direitos 
humanos em um mundo pluralista e culturalmente diversifi cado. Analisa os 
desafi os que surgem atualmente de certas políticas de direitos humanos que 
os instrumentalizam sob o pretexto de uma “guerra global contra o terror” 
e os redefi ne em termos de promoção da democracia e regime de mudança, 
assim como aqueles desafi os que surgem de ideologias que questionam os 
princípios básicos dos direitos humanos e provocam a assim chamada “crise de 
legitimação”. O texto argumenta pela necessidade de restaurar o signifi cado 
genuíno de direitos humanos e do papel dos cidadãos em lutar por sua imple-
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In this paper, I will begin with Kant’s concept of human rights as freedom 
and his ideal of cosmopolitan order, arguing for their relevance. I will examine the 
concept of human rights as moral rights, as developed by the religious theorists, such 
as Nicholas Wolterstorff (2011, 2008). Then I will analyze the alternative concepts, 
mainly focusing on the discourse-ethics approach to justification of human rights 
by philosophers such as Karl-Otto Apel (1997) and Jürgen Habermas (2001, 2008, 
2010). I will also analyze the concepts of human dignity and “emerging morality” 
by Arturo Roig (2000, 1997, 1994, 1981) and the “ethics of liberation” by Enrique 
Dussel (1998). The paper culminates by relating human rights to the current debate 
on cosmopolitanism.
Restoring the Genuine Meaning of Human Rights
In rethinking the problem of human rights, it is helpful to look at their modern 
origins. The genesis of human rights shows their moral core stemming from different 
religious and philosophical grounds. From the very beginning of the development 
of the humanitarian rights concept there was a moral underpinning, essential to 
its meaning. The concept of human rights had religious-moral origins: It emerged 
during the 16th and 17th centuries in theological disputes, the Reformation, the 
ensuing struggle for religious tolerance, and the popular liberal movements. The 
first and most basic of all human rights was freedom of religion, which was further 
articulated as freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly. Assertions of the 
free use of one’s own natural capacities (the complex of rights to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness) and property (the complex of property rights) was based 
in Western societies on the struggle for religious freedom and toleration. This es-
tablishes the core unity of human rights, which was clearly stated, for example, in 
John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (Locke and Peardon, 1952).
Universal human rights are the ethical criteria for positive social rights. In 
philosophy, such an ethical justification of rights was sustained by Kant, Fichte, 
von Humbolt, and other representatives of German liberalism. A deviation from this 
trend, resulting in a more utilitarian interpretation of rights and the diminishing 
of the universal ethical meaning of human rights, can be traced to interpretations 
of basic subjective rights in the late Enlightenment (for example, in the works of 
Claude Helvetius and the physiocrats in France and the so-called “utilitarian liberal-
ism” of Jeremy Bentham). Such utilitarian justifications of human rights are ques-
tionable from the normative point of view. The original meaning of human rights 
is overshadowed by such themes as economic independence, private property, free 
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mentação. Com Kant como pano de fundo, o texto mostra que a afi rmação 
de que visões religiosas ao redor do mundo fornecem a única fundamentação 
inteligível, como em Nicholas Wolterstorff, enfrenta sérios desafi os em um 
mundo plural e culturalmente diverso. O texto então analisa os conceitos não 
religiosos que buscam desenvolver um tratamento dos direitos humanos que 
não dependa de controvérsias metafísicas ou doutrinas religiosas. Examina-
se o tratamento dos direitos humanos da perspectiva da ética do discurso 
desenvolvida em Karl-Otto Apel e em Jürgen Habermas. Ele também analisa o 
conceitos de dignidade humana e “moralidade emergente” de Arturo Roig e a 
“ética da libertação” de Enrique Dussel. A análise mostra a continua relevância 
das ideias de Kant e seus desenvolvimentos recentes por teóricos do discurso, 
da ética do diálogo e do cosmopolitismo democrático.
Palavras-chave: direitos humanos, liberdade, dignidade, cosmopolitismo, Kant.
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enterprise, and a free market economy. As result, since the early 19th century, the 
concept of human rights has become a target of criticism from legal positivism, 
and from socialist, neoliberal, and neoconservative ideologies.
In opposition to this utilitarian interpretation, there have been efforts to regain 
the original meaning of human rights and of the development of strong ethical 
justifications of the subjective rights and liberties of the individual. Such efforts find 
their inspiration especially in Kant’s philosophy (Kant, 1996, 1964).
Kant’s political thought and philosophy of law are intrinsically related to 
his ethics. They were developed against utilitarianism in morality and paternalism 
in politics. Although the categorical imperative (universal moral law) is a single 
principle, Kant distinguishes its three formulations: the principle of universality, 
the principle of the intrinsic value of each person, and the principle of autonomy. 
For Kant, morality and right (Recht–legal right) are intrinsically related, and both 
can be expressed as the categorical imperative. Transcendental ethics has from the 
very beginning contained a powerful theoretical-juridical potential, and Kant’s phi-
losophy of law provides its closest conceptual-juridical continuation. Morality and 
right in the transcendental-practical doctrine function as two equally important and 
complementary parts of a single liberal deontology. For Kant the notion of right is 
ethically grounded, and it requires the idea of a constitutional state.
Kant’s categorical imperative was a critical response to the heteronomous and 
utilitarian view of morality, which he associated with authoritarian rule. Similarly, 
the categorical imperative of right was his reaction to the juridical views promoted 
by moralization and state-centered ideas (statism). 
 According to Kant, there is only one innate right: the birthright of freedom. 
“Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as 
it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, 
is the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (Kant, 
1996, p. 30). This principle of innate freedom already involves the innate equality 
of every human being, the right to be independent, and to be one’s own master 
(sui juris). In the context of the categorical imperative of right, Kant formulates the 
concept of human rights. He is talking about the right of an individual as freedom. 
Freedom is the sole original right; it is inherent to each human being by virtue of 
his or her humanity. From the concept of freedom the whole concept of an external 
right is derived. From the idea of freedom it follows that individuals living within 
the civil sate as a state of law are free, equal and self-dependent. This concept is 
opposed to a more utilitarian interpretation of rights and political paternalism.
Kant’s philosophy helps us to better understand the meaning of the definition 
of human rights as inherent and inalienable, as formulated by Thomas Jefferson in 
the United States Declaration of Independence. Kant makes these meanings explicit, 
and he elaborates on the moral-philosophical explanations of humanitarian rights. His 
transcendental-practical philosophy was able to adequately express the philosophical 
underpinning of this view. The term “inalienable rights” meant that fundamental hu-
man rights are “inherent” or “imprescriptible”, thus recognized as belonging to man 
forever. The forgotten meaning of “inalienable” is that an individual himself is not 
allowed to surrender his rights or relinquish them for any pragmatic considerations. 
Since no citizen is allowed to relinquish his or her freedom, similarly, a nation as a 
whole can not to do so, either. Therefore, a human being, by recognizing his or her 
fundamental individual rights as “inalienable”, has an obligation to exist politically free 
forever. Kant distinguishes between natural and acquired rights. The natural right is 
the sole original right, and it consists of freedom. It is an internal right. It is different 
from an acquired right—an external right, secured by a legal act. The human right to 
freedom indicates the original unity of meaning of human rights.
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Kant emphasizes that a person, as the subject of a morally-practical reason, is 
not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, 
but is to be prized as an end in himself; that he or she “possesses a dignity (an 
absolute inner worth)”, deserving the respect of others, and reciprocating respect 
of their dignity as well. “And this self-esteem is a duty of man to himself” (Kant, 
1996, p. 187).
He outlines the theory of right in accordance with the concept of freedom. 
A social relationship in freedom among individuals under coercive laws is implied 
in the concept of a civil constitution. Kant defines the civil state as a lawful state, 
based on a priori principles, according to which every member enjoys the freedom 
as a human being, the equality as a subject, and the independence as a citizen 
(Kant, 1991, p. 74).
Kant strongly opposed moral utilitarianism. Similarly, his philosophy of law 
was developed with systematic criticism of political paternalism (which is the flip 
side of dependence). Kant developed his definition of individual freedom in op-
position to authoritarian paternalism, utilitarian arbitrariness, and the “despotism 
of paternalistic benevolence”. Kant’s formulation articulates the anti-paternalistic 
orientation of his view of right. For Kant, a paternalistic government, treating its 
citizens like immature children and thus infringing upon their freedom, is “the most 
despotic of all” (Kant, 1996, p. 94). When citizens are “paternalized” by govern-
ment, they become dependent on it and lose their freedoms. For example, today 
under the pretext of providing security and protecting citizens from “terrorists,” 
their privacy is invaded and their civil liberties infringed upon, or taken away. But 
who will protect them from Big Brother’s tyranny?
Raising moral and legal objections against the abuse of power by rulers, 
Kant equally rejects servility on the part of the citizens, seeing it as the flip-side of 
paternalistic despotism. Citizens, who rely on the state and give up their civil liber-
ties in exchange for the promises of protection and benefits, actually pander to the 
authoritarian trend of power. When the bubble of the unfulfilled promises bursts 
and the state policies and programs collapse, no one is held accountable; while the 
people shoulder the burden. Kant argues against considering autonomy as a bargain-
ing chip: freedom must not be exchanged for welfare. No money in the world can 
by human dignity and freedom. He philosophically justifies the individual’s right to 
political freedom. The individuals have both the opportunity and the responsibility 
to make use of their minds, thus becoming enlightened and active citizens. Kant 
gives the individual firm ground for striving to realize his or her rights and thus the 
possibility to be the master of one’s own destiny.
In contrast to paternalism, Kant elaborates a concept of autonomy, distin-
guishing its three varieties: moral, utilitarian, and civic. The opposite of paternalism 
is the rule of law, which is the basis for civil society. The rule of law is granted by 
three types of legal norms: human rights, legal guarantees of social equality, and 
democratic rights (or the rights of an active citizenship). The principles of right 
should guarantee the citizens’ independence from paternalistic wardship and, on 
the other hand, guarantee their security within the state.
Since every society is related to all other societies, it needs peaceful outer 
conditions for its internal freedom; thus the free citizens of a republican state must 
seek peaceful relations with other peoples and establish peaceful alliances, and, ul-
timately, a voluntary federation of free states. The culmination of Kant’s philosophy 
of law was his vision of lasting peace through the lawful alliance of states—which 
would serve as an alternative both to lawless anarchy and to Leviathan of a “world 
republic” (as despotic “universal monarchy”). Therefore, the categorical imperative 
is threefold: the imperatives of morality, right, and peace; and each of them is in 
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the form of a categorical imperative. This shows the genuine ethical foundation of 
law and politics.
This Kantian concept of the human right to freedom and his political phi-
losophy provides us with an indispensable key for making sense of the complexity 
of the human rights issue today. To put it simply, today’s task of regaining robust 
democracy is inseparable from the necessity of restoring the genuine meaning 
of human rights and of the role of citizens in striving for their implementation. 
Kant’s proposed solutions–establishment of the rule of law within society and in 
the international arena, a peaceful federation of free states, enlightenment of the 
citizenry and their representatives, and the foundation of a cosmopolitan of law in 
accordance with the idea of Human Rights–remain apt and urgent.
Human Rights Versus 
“Humanitarian Interventionism”
Scholars distinguish several phases in the discourse of human rights, which 
are more or less correlated with the major “turning points” in the history of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The First World War urged nations to establish 
the League of Nations (1919), which was the first attempt to implement a Kantian 
project of perpetual peace. After the Second World War there was the second at-
tempt – the formation of the United Nations in 1945, whose express purpose was 
to maintain world peace and to promote human rights. It became an alternative 
to politically organized violence. The International Bill of Human Rights was the ex-
pression of the notion that human freedom and dignity is the nucleus from which 
a multidimensional, universally valid system of human rights might be derived. The 
morality of individual rights was crystallized in international law, which was adopted 
by consensus by the UN as the most authoritative international body, thus establish-
ing the foundation upon which the idea of human rights can rest.
The end of the Cold War opened new opportunities for amelioration of inter-
national relations and created expectations of the implementation of human rights 
in the world. However the neoconservative “revolution” and the shift in U.S. policy 
to hegemonic unilateralism derailed this process. Human rights discourse obtained 
a new function, that of the justification of sanctions and “humanitarian” military 
invasions, framed as “enforcement” of international human rights law. The traditional 
“transcendental” or normative aspect of human rights was obfuscated, and they 
became viewed as firmly seated in concrete political communities, governmental 
institutions, and positive law. Legality was in this way replaced with a “moraliza-
tion” of international politics grounded in the ethos of a hegemonic superpower 
(Demenchonok, 2010, p. 346-348; see also, Demenchonok, 2009).
“Global War on Terror” as President Bush’s political doctrine and the U.S. 
invasion in Iraq in violation of international law were accompanied by the grave 
abuses of human rights, including Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, the policies on 
detentions, harsh interrogations which amount to torture, and warrantless wire-
tapping. The attempts to justify the policies violating human rights were made by 
reinterpreting and challenging the Geneva Conventions and habeas corpus, as well 
as by claims to set the new norms.
This policy and ideology, threatening to reverse the achievements in the area 
of human rights, provoked deep concerns among philosophers, political scientists, 
and human rights activists. They are concerned about the challenges which today 
come from certain policies of human rights which instrumentalize them and un-
der pretext of a “global war on terror” claim the “supreme emergency” exception 
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against the principle of discrimination in war or justification of torture. They are 
also concerned about the ideologies challenging the core principles of human rights 
and provoking the so called “crisis of legitimization” with respect to human rights. 
This provided a new stimulus for discussions regarding the theory of human rights.
Attempts at the Religious Grounding 
of Human Rights in a Culturally Diverse World
The commonly accepted foundation of human rights is the dignity of the hu-
man person. Nevertheless, the ideal of human dignity is thought of as relying upon 
different aspects of the human being: on its nature, on reason, on social integration, 
or on relations toward the God. Among these approaches, the main division in the 
justification of the idea of human rights is between those which appeal in some 
way to religions, and, on the other hand, those seeking to provide a non-religious 
and non-metaphysical philosophical grounding. 
In the West, the idea of human rights has been traditionally rooted in Christian 
theology and has grown beyond its theological origin. The religious interpretation 
emphasizes the genealogy of human rights discourse, which derives from assump-
tions about God as the central power of moral order in the universe and of human 
beings endowed by Him with certain inalienable rights. 
The contemporary adherents of this interpretation attempt to show what 
they purport to be the necessary conceptual dependence of human rights upon one 
religious conviction or other. Their premise that the idea of human rights can and 
must be grounded religiously is accompanied by skepticism regarding all secular 
justification of human rights. Religious and secular approaches are viewed as mu-
tually exclusive. However the attempts at the religious grounding of human rights 
are facing problems, given the culturally diverse world in which there are many 
religions as well as many peoples with non-religious worldviews. The religious argu-
ments of justification may be convincing for some, yet not convincing for others. 
But regardless of the possible strengths and weaknesses of the religious arguments, 
the problem arises from claiming that only they provide the “true” justification as 
opposed to any secular philosophical justification. 
The adherents of the religiously grounded concept of human rights – Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Michael Perry, Hans Küng, and Max Stackhouse, among others – have 
in common their claims about the religious roots of the idea of human rights, and 
the dismissal of the nonreligious philosophical justification for human rights. This 
approach would create difficulties for the project of globalizing human rights, 
because in a culturally and religiously diverse world people with different views 
about religion and persons with nonreligious worldviews would have difficulties in 
accepting legitimacy of human rights. 
The religious approach to justification of human rights is developed, for 
example, by Nicholas Wolterstorff. He traces the origins of natural inherent human 
rights back to the Hebrew Bible and the Christian scriptures and elaborates on their 
theological articulation. He argues that natural rights are grounded in the worth of 
the right-holders, in the equal and ineradicable dignity that we each have qua hu-
man being. Thus the theorists need to identify the feature or relationship of human 
beings on which that dignity supervenes, and that would ground human rights. He 
considers this feature as the relationship of human beings to God. 
From this perspective, Wolterstorff criticizes the secular philosophical con-
cepts of dignity for appealing to certain capacities that human beings possess. As 
an alternative, in looking for a theistic grounding of natural human rights that 
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would not in any way involve a reference to human capacities, he turns to the 
worth-imparting relation of human beings to God: to the idea of God’s redemp-
tive love of every creature who bears the imago Dei, bestowing each human being 
with great and equal worth. Natural human rights in here in the worth bestowed 
on human beings by God’s love: “Natural human rights are what respect for that 
worth requires” (Wolterstorff, 2008, p. 352, 360). The conviction of God’s love for 
each and every human being equally provides the believers with a distinct way of 
grounding natural human rights. Also the conviction is that God holds human be-
ings accountable for doing justice; and human beings must treat each other justly, 
in ways that properly reflect their worth (Wolterstorff, 2008, p. 89, 361).
Wolterstorff further argues that “it is impossible to develop a secular account 
for human dignity adequate for grounding human rights” (2008, p. 325). He at-
tempts to proof this thesis by targeting Kant’s philosophy: “Almost all secular at-
tempts at accounting for the dignity that grounds human rights do so by appealing 
to certain capacities that human beings possess, and almost all of those, in turn, 
follow Kant in appealing to the capacity for rational agency” (Wolterstorff, 2011, 
p. 148). His criticism is focused on the Kantian celebration of the human capacity for 
rational agency and autonomous legislation. He considers Kant “the paradigmatic 
representative of this approach” and asserts “the fatal flaw in Kant’s capacities ap-
proach to human dignity”, thus his critique is supposed to be the testing ground 
for the adequacy of secular philosophy (Wolterstorff, 2008, p. 325, 333).
Wolterstorff charges Kant’s grounding of human rights with three problems. 
First, that Kantian ethics allegedly implies that rational beings differ in worth, thus 
in dignity. But Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative around the 
concept of dignity (sometimes referred as the practical imperative or principle of 
dignity) clearly displays the intrinsic value of persons: “Act in such a way that you 
always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, 
never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end” (Kant, 1964, p. 
96). Kant sees humanity itself as possessing fundamental worth—dignity. Humanity 
in a human being is what makes each person worthy of being treated as an end. It 
has absolute value. In contrast to “things” as the objects of inclination, which have 
only a conditional and relative value, rational beings as “persons” have an intrinsic 
value: dignity. One possesses dignity by virtue of one’s humanity, and all members 
of the humankind have it. 
Kant explained human dignity in relation to reason. It is because of the gift 
of reason that human beings have dignity. They are capable of understanding the 
implications of the universality of the maxims of their actions. Humanity itself is 
considered a dignity because of its rationality. Humans are dignified as autonomous, 
capable of legislating moral law into themselves. Humanity means the capacity to 
make autonomous rational choice, to set ends for oneself, and to guide one’s actions 
by values one considers reasonable to accept. Dignity is associated with the respect 
to the categorical imperative, giving it an account of it unconditional authority by 
grounding it in the nature of free rational agency. The principle of morality gets 
its authority from the fact that it is by acting from the principle that we exercise 
our free agency. According to the categorical imperative, none may be reduced, or 
reduce themselves, to mere means or objects. In the language of rights, it means 
that every member of the human race possesses human rights. The dignity of the 
human beings must be considered in the way in which they are entitled to be treated. 
Second, Wolterstorff attempts to relativise the Kantian concept of intrinsic 
human worth and to present it as implying so called “differentiated dignity.” In 
mentioning the differences of the intellectual performance of people, who have 
a varying amount of technical skills and whose rational capacities develop as they 
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mature, he argues that “the capacity for rational agency comes in degrees, so the 
worth a human being has on account of possessing the capacity also comes in 
degrees,” which violates “the equal-worth proviso” (Wolterstorff 2011, p. 148). He 
further concludes that because the capacity for rational agency comes in degrees, 
resulting in different worth, it is “intrinsically related to the differential dignity that 
supervenes on the particular extent of the capacity one possesses and one’s com-
petence in exercising it” (Wolterstorff, 2011, p. 149). Wolterstorff attributes this 
“highly differentiated dignity” to the capacity approach, as a contrast to the idea 
of equal dignity. But this opposition is rather constructed by Wolterstorff himself, 
and the capacity approach does not imply inequality in worth and dignity. 
Technical skills, intellectual abilities, as well as moral wisdom should not be 
taken for granted, but rather need to be developed, and this takes effort. Thus 
the importance of education, for example. What matters is to see the differences 
in exercising rational capacities from the point of view of the necessity for each 
person to develop them and to make efforts for intellectual growth and moral 
self-perfection (and also in the Enlightenment sense of learning how to think for 
oneself). But this level of analysis concerning the diverse and dynamic aspects of 
developing and using one’s intellectual abilities should not be confused with more 
general and higher levels of analysis. The philosophical approach to the rational 
nature of human beings leads to conclusions regarding the general capacity of a 
person to set ends and act according to reason, to have the intrinsic worth and 
dignity of humanity. Kant’s ethical theory is grounded in the idea of the dignity of 
the rational nature of every human being. 
Third, Wolterstorff criticizes philosophical justifications for human rights 
for grounding the moral worth of human being not only with reference to the 
specific human capacity for rational agency and autonomous legislation but also 
ontologically distinguishing human from nonhuman animals and the differences 
in their capabilities. He accuses the capacity approach of not including into the 
“circle of dignity” those human beings whom he considers lacking the capacity for 
rational agency (such as Alzheimer’s patients who are no longer capable, and the 
mentally impaired who have never been capable, or infants). He uses the so called 
the argument from “marginal” cases, practiced by species-ism in the discussions 
regarding “nonrational” human beings (the marginal cases of humanity) and the 
rights of nonhuman animals (some which are highly intelligent and sociable such 
as dolphins) (Wolterstorff, 2011, p. 146-147). According to this argument, not all 
humans are rational, yet if such humans are morally considerable it would be in-
consistent to deny animals with similar capacities a moral consideration, therefore, 
either marginal humans and animals are both morally considerable or neither are. 
This apparent dilemma implies that the nonreligious idea of human rights presup-
poses either that animals do not have rights of their own or that human rights will 
always trump animal rights. He concludes that due to the undeniable variation 
among our possession and use of the relevant capacities, the capacities approach 
cannot adequately protect the equal moral worth of all human beings. It also would 
elevate some animals having the capacities above the threshold of moral dignity, 
while it would depreciate those human beings who lack the capacities, and thus 
“fall outside the circle of dignity” (Wolterstorff, 2008, p. 330).
Wolterstorff’s arguments are questionable. The exceptional (“marginal”) 
cases he referred to still do not disprove the fundamental characteristic of humans 
as rational beings. Reason is considered to be a definitive characteristic of human 
nature, and it is closely identified with the ability to self-consciously change attitudes 
and therefore with the capacity for freedom and self-determination. The argument 
from marginal cases has been criticized by those who consider it too blunt to explain 
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why animals have rights and it is insensitive regarding cases of human beings who 
lack certain rational capacities.
According to Kant, treating a person as an “end-in-himself” means treat-
ing him or her as a rational being. Rational beings are those who are capable of 
reasoning about their conduct and who freely decide what they will do based on 
their understanding of what is best. They are treated as responsible and may be 
rewarded or punished for their actions. Children or mentally ill persons are not con-
sidered lacking their human dignity, and they must expected to be treated properly. 
Children are included in the Kantian moral universe, considering that childhood 
is a stage in the life of a person who normally develops to autonomy. The proper 
treatment of children should fully consider the rational capacities that they are in 
the process of developing. With regard to the children with intellectual disabilities, 
in contrast to the argument from “marginal” cases, many theorists prefer more in-
clusive approaches and more adequate strategies that provide guidance about the 
moral responsibilities adults have towards children. They agree that the potential of 
children with intellectual disabilities is morally considerable, and explore the moral 
significance of intellectual capacities, the capacity for welfare, and the interests of 
others (Mullin, 2011, p. 291-305).
The moral standing of mentally ill or incapacitated human beings comes from 
their membership in a species in whom rational capacity is the norm. The criteria 
of their proper treatment differ from those for fully competent agents, considering 
their interests and respect for their level of self-government. This includes a differ-
entiation between those who are responsible for their actions and those who are 
not, such as mentally ill people, who are not in control of themselves and therefore 
cannot be “held accountable”. Thus people do not address them as autonomous 
individuals but rather treat them properly in a manipulative way. 
Kant believed that our moral duty to animals are merely “indirect duties toward 
humanity”, and if we mistreat animals cruelly, this might damage our moral character 
and ultimately lead to inappropriate treatment of other human beings. This opinion 
needs to be viewed within the historical context of his time. The “indirect duties” 
are criticized by contemporary defenders of direct duties to animals and “animal 
rights”. However, some philosophers separate Kant’s theory from his opinion about 
the moral status of animals, and defend his theory and most of his conclusions. They 
view in Kant’s approach alternative perspectives, supporting views in the sense that 
we have duties to every human being and significant duties regarding non-human 
animals, duties which involve direct concern for animals because of their nature 
(Wood, 2008). Some philosophers consider that the issues of the moral status of 
animals should be discussed not as variations on traditional ethical theories, but 
rather require new ethical theories. The questions arise whether any theories that 
were originally developed to explain relations among human beings are transfer-
able without loss to non-humans. When the traditional ethical theories, taken out 
of context, are applied to non-humans, they may give animals too much or too 
little credit. In any case, regarding animals it is reasonable to say that to hold that 
autonomy confers special moral standing on persons is not to deny that there are 
other forms of value or that there are other kinds of entities that can make claims 
on us. Thus certain ways of treating non-rational creatures are morally deficient. 
Moreover, Wolterstorff warns that the practical implementation of the Kan-
tian approach would have negative consequences for society and would result in 
greater inequality. “So in a society founded on Kantian principles, where it is widely 
held that nothing else than rationality determines worth”,—he writes, — “we must 
expect that the less rational among us will be systematically demeaned” (Wolter-
storff, 2008, p. 391). 
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But Kant’s concept of human rights does not imply any hierarchy or inequality 
in worth among people based on the levels of rationality, or any other capacity. Kant 
formulated the concept of human rights based on the innate right of an individual 
for freedom. This principle of innate freedom already involves the innate equality 
of every human being, the right to be independent, and to be one’s own master. 
Existing inequality in social status and wealth, or dependence of individuals upon 
the will of others, however, is “in no way opposed to their freedom and equality as 
human beings, who together make up a people” (Kant, 1996, p. 92).
Kant champions the principle that each human being, as rationally self-
governing, has dignity or absolute worth, and the worth of all persons is funda-
mentally equal. He views reason is the capacity to regulate our conduct by universal 
principles of respect and concern shared with others. It means respect for yourself 
as a rational being, arising from the recognition of rational nature in your own 
person as an end in itself, which at the same time requires you to respect rational 
nature in the person of every other human being. Reason is also the capacity for 
self-government according to universally valid norms. It is oriented toward a realm 
of human ends, that include the dignity and welfare of all people and thus can be 
rationally shared between them. 
Kant’s philosophy contains a radical critique of social life, which remains in 
many respects relevant. According to it, through the faculty of reason we have the 
capacity to criticize or correct everything, including our own misunderstandings 
of reason itself. Kantian ethics is critical toward the dehumanizing tendencies in 
modern society. Kant saw grounds for hope regarding the gradual success toward 
perpetual peace in three tendencies: the “spirit of commerce” and the unifying 
power of world trade; the republican constitution and the peaceful character of 
republics; and the function of the political public sphere and the “publicness” of 
all lawful claims (Kant, 1991, p. 114, 100, 126). The political public sphere is the 
public use of reason, which is not restricted by authorities, but makes it possible 
for us to address a broad audience and to form justifications that anyone may ac-
cept. Kant insists that public reason must always be free: “it alone can bring about 
enlightenment among people”.
Wolterstorff’s fears about “a society founded on Kantian principles” are off 
target. In today’s world, the demarcation of inequality among people lies not along 
the line of “rationality” (as Wolterstorff suggests), but mainly is determined by the 
power structures, which concentrate wealth and economic-political domination 
in the hands of the power elites, leaving the rest of the people dependent and 
their rights infringed upon. The problem is not that a society is founded on the 
rational principles of Kantian ethical, legal, and political philosophy, but rather 
that these principles were not implemented consistently and decisively enough. 
Thus the Kantian project of a lawful society and a peaceful world order of per-
petual peace has been derailed by the counter-tendencies of anti-democratic 
domination, ideological manipulation, power politics, and globalized violence. 
Today’s neoliberal “free market” economy and its politics, dominated by big 
corporations, imposes technocratic “instrumental rationality”, which effects are 
depersonalization and dehumanization. It is the opposite of human reason and 
values promoted by humanistic philosophical and political thought. Kant starts 
his inquiry into politics from the standpoint of the free individual, resisting the 
controlling and repressive practices of social power structures. He proposed the 
core human right—freedom—as a principle, based on which an individual can be 
his own master, and thus independently pursue his own happiness. His philosophy, 
representing humanistic thought, provides with powerful intellectual means and 
inspiration to those who are striving for human rights.
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During the last decades philosophers tried to develop more novel philosophical 
accounts of human rights as alternatives to a more traditional natural rights account. 
One of them is an account of human rights from the perspective of “discourse ethics”.
The Discourse Ethics Approach to Human Rights
Kant’s ideas have been rethought and creatively developed by the theorists 
of “discourse ethics” and cosmopolitanism. Discourse ethics, following a tradition 
of critical theory, is critically rethinking and reassessing the traditional concepts of 
human rights. The discourse ethics approach to human rights is developed by Karl-
Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas and more recently by Rainer Forst, Seyla Benhabib 
(2011), and James Bohman. It aims to provide a rational account of human rights 
free from controversial philosophical or religious assumptions that could hinder 
reaching a broader consensus. In contrast to a “moralizing” conception of human 
rights as a set of fixed moral rights that can be determined independently of the 
collective deliberation in a public sphere, discourse ethics seeks to promote a dis-
cursive approach and intercultural dialogue.
Karl-Otto Apel, in undertaking his project of a transformation of philosophy, 
elaborates on a philosophical grounding of discourse or communicative ethics. In 
contrast to the traditional paradigm of grounding through deriving something from 
something else (i.e., deduction, induction, or abduction), the new approach is based 
on a strict transcendental-pragmatic reflection on the presupposition of arguing. 
Apel argues for unconditional normativity as a possible and necessary condition 
for ethics. He is concerned with the transcendental and ultimate grounding of dis-
course ethics. The theory of discourse ethics emphasizes intersubjectivity, moving 
from the monological voice of Kantian ethics toward the dialogical voice of com-
municative action. This approach transformed Kant’s transcendental argumentation 
into a transcendental-pragmatic argumentation that looks at the procedures for 
the justification of ethical judgments in terms of pragmatic consistency and not in 
terms of logical consistency (Apel, 1997). Universality is understood as procedural 
and not as substantive. Within such analysis, performative self-contradiction is a 
crucial test for the universality both of the real communication community and of 
the counterfactual ideal communication community. Discourse ethics is both uni-
versalistic and teleological. By referring to the transcendental-pragmatic ultimate 
foundation of ethics, Apel asserts that morality can be grounded on the elucidation 
of the norms of meaningful argumentation. It also indicates the inherent correlation 
between the structure of rational discourse and the intrinsic rules and norms that 
are morally relevant for human interaction. The normative contents of discourse 
ethics include the principles of justice, reciprocity, respect, tolerance, solidarity, and 
co-responsibility.
Jürgen Habermas highlights a paramount importance of human rights as “the 
sole recognized basis of legitimation” for the international politics in a diverse and 
conflicting world. However, the human rights discourse, which has been argued on 
normative terms, raised questions about the validity and content of human rights and 
the relevance of their legitimation, as developed in the West, to the other cultures. 
Habermas analyses the hermeneutical reflections on the starting point of a human 
rights discourse among participants of different cultures. In critically assessing their 
differing and sometimes opposite views, he draws a fine line between tradition 
and innovation, between Western and non-Western concepts, and between the 
universal meaning of human rights and the local conditions of their realization. He 
highlights what he considers sound ideas both in the Western heritage and in the 
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ideas of non-Western theorists, contrasting them with the extremes of Eurocentric 
or any ethnocentric pseudo-universality and of religious fundamentalism. 
His assumption that the standards of human rights emerged from the attempt 
to answer challenges posed by a social modernity – experienced first in Europe and 
later on in other regions of the world as multiple versions of modernity – helps to 
better understand the common roots of these standards. Thus human rights and 
their legitimation is not exclusively an invention of Western civilization, but rather 
an answer to general social challenges faced by the contemporary world. In the 
socially-culturally diverse world, the answer found by the West is not the only one, 
or even necessarily the best one.
Habermas argues that human rights are not simply moral rights, but are 
“Janus-faced”, related simultaneously to morality and to law: they have both their 
moral content and the form of legal rights (Habermas, 2001, p. 118). The core of 
the debate lies in the individualism and secular character of human rights that are 
centered in the concept of autonomy. Habermas analyses the controversy between 
the individualistic character of human rights and the collectivist “Asiatic values.” The 
latter emphasizes the priority of the community over the individual, has no clear dis-
tinction between law and ethics, and insists on the individuals’ subordination to the 
community-based ethos rooted in a cultural tradition. On the one hand, Habermas 
points out the blind spot of the neoliberal individualism, which ignores the fact that 
legally protected human rights are derived from intersubjectively recognized norms 
of a legal community. On the other hand, he shows the failure of the collectivist 
thesis that claims of the legal community have priority over individual legal claims. 
Instead, an opposition between individualist and collectivist views of human rights 
can be avoided if an approach to fundamental legal concepts considers “the dialec-
tical unity of individuation and socialization processes” (Habermas, 2001, p. 126). 
Within the discourse-theoretical approach to human rights Habermas analyses 
the role of religion in the public sphere. Especial attention to this theme resonates 
with the recent resurgence of religion, which stirred discussions [among scholars] 
about the meaning of the public and its relation to the private, and about the very 
categories of secularism and religion. The concept of multiple modernities questions 
the relation of modernization to secularization. Despite increasing technological 
development and modernization, religion has not “withered away,” and thus an 
analysis of its role in public deliberations is very relevant. These discussions involve 
rethinking of issues of justice, toleration, and human rights.
Of note is that John Rawls (1999) anticipated the problem of how to accom-
modate the resurgence of religion and significantly contributed to the philosophi-
cal discussion on the role of religion in the public sphere. This theme became an 
aspect of his focus on issues of justice. He asserted the view that we should not 
confuse the secularization of the state with the secularization of society (the view 
which serves today for the critique of the attempts to review political theology). He 
distinguished between the comprehensive and the political. Thus a secular position 
could be and was as comprehensive as any religious position. For Rawls, the idea of 
public reason is that it does not criticize any comprehensive doctrine, religious or 
nonreligious, except insofar as it is incompatible with a democratic polity (Rawls, 
2002, p. 149-151). While citizens do not expected to compromise their religious 
or non-religious views, they must not attempt to impose them or to change the 
constitutions so as to establish their religions’ hegemony. According to Rawls, the 
grounding of the idea of human rights does not need to invoke any “comprehensive 
doctrine” and they are rather based upon a person’s status as a citizen within a 
well-ordered society. Human rights are derived from a basic understanding of public 
reason. The “original position” can provide the necessary level of generality. Thus in 
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the sphere of public reason the members of different religious denominations and 
nonbelievers can come together to achieve consensus about human rights. Rawls’s 
latest works are focused on the problem of reconciling pluralism with global justice.
Habermas follows Rawls’s approach to religion in the public sphere, while 
critically revising it and going beyond. He thinks that in modernity politics shifted 
to civil society based on the public use of reason. Civil society, however, should 
refer also to religious sources, if they are “translated” in a way understandable to 
secular people. Habermas stresses the importance of cultivating a “postsecular” 
stance, which considers religious sources of meaning and motivation as helpful in 
confronting the negative consequences of hegemonic globalization. As he explains, 
“postsecular” is used as a sociological predicate to describe not society itself, but 
a change of consciousness in it, referring to an altered self-understanding of the 
largely secularized Western societies, which are dealing with the continuing existence 
of different religious groups and traditions (Habermas, 2010).
Nevertheless, the crucial difference between faith and knowledge remains. 
Because the public sphere is a realm of rational argumentation, it requires the ability 
and willingness to participate in open debate. Habermas is concerned that religious 
ideas may be expressed in language that is not accessible to those outside their 
traditions, and thus the need to translate them into secular reason. He suggests that 
the potential “truth contents” brought by religious people to public discourse be 
translated into a secular idiom and into a “generally accessible language” (Haber-
mas, 2008, p. 130-131). This will facilitate the incorporation of the ethical insights 
of religious traditions into a “postmetaphysical” philosophical perspective. This 
translation is a task that falls to both religious and secular citizens engaged in the 
public use of reason. 
Habermas explores discursive mediation in democracy and the capacity to 
share common believes to solve the problems. Nonreligious persons should realize 
the limits of secular reason and seek to understand what is said on religious grounds 
as best they can. But not all that religious citizens may say can be translated, and 
for this informal public discourse would be appropriate. Thus Habermas considers 
it necessary to stay in the realm of what could be shared. 
For Habermas, the discussion about secularization is a starting point for clari-
fying the self-understanding of postmetaphysical thinking. This suggests favoring 
a dialogical relationship with all religious traditions open to learning. At the same 
time, the postmetaphysical thinking is secular thinking which distinguishes faith and 
knowledge as two different modes of taking-to-be-true: “we may call ‘postsecular’ 
the situation in which secular reason and a religious consciousness that has become 
reflexive engage in a relationship, in which, for instance, the dialogue between 
Jaspers and Bultmann is exemplary” (Habermas, 2010, p. 5).
Habermas points out that universal principles for the public role of religion 
have to be specified and institutionalized differently according to each local context, 
such as the differences in political cultures between Europe and the US. His criticism 
is directed against the “laicist” understanding of the separation of church and state 
typical for Europe. Thus his emphasis on greater tolerance or even accommoda-
tion within the public sphere of arguments which religious citizens could make. 
In contrast (apparently referring to the US), he says that in the “country, in which 
the President publicly prays in office, the criticism that orients itself by the same 
principle should aim in the opposite political direction”. This is because the forces, 
which are unwilling to subject the political influence of religious voices to formal 
constraints, “blur the limits without which a secular state cannot maintain its im-
partiality”. Similar criticism should be directed against fundamentalist doctrines. As 
the safeguard against these extremes, the decisions of the legislative, the executive, 
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and the judiciary branches should be “not only formulated in a universally acces-
sible language, but also justified on the basis of universally acceptable reasons” 
(Habermas, 2010, p. 9).
In analyzing the communicative action and the use of reason, Habermas indi-
cates that the sphere of validity of a rightness claim varies according to the boundaries 
of a social world, but “moral imperatives (and legal norms such as human rights that 
can only be justified morally) claim absolute validity, that is, universal recognition”. 
Thus, according to Kant, valid moral laws must be “universalizable”. The idea of a 
morally ordered community implies “the counterfactual extension of the social world in 
which we find ourselves to a completely inclusive world of well-ordered interpersonal 
relationships: all human beings become brothers and sisters” (Habermas, 2008, p. 47).
Habermas further tries to clarify the position of postmetaphysical thinking 
between naturalism and religion and to come to terms with religious and ideological 
pluralism. He examines the “clash” between two conflicting intellectual trends—the 
spread of naturalistic scientistic worldviews and the growing political influences of 
religious orthodoxies across the world. Neither of these two trends shows a willing-
ness to engage in self-reflection, thus resulting in ideological polarization. Referring 
to the US, he writes: “A political culture that polarizes itself irreconcilably along the 
fault-line of secular versus religious conflicts, whether over issues of human embryo 
research, abortion, or the treatment of comatose patients, challenges civic com-
mon sense even in the world’s oldest democracy”. In contrast to this, “The ethos 
of liberal citizenship demands that both sides should determine the limits of faith 
and knowledge in a reflexive manner” (Habermas, 2008, p. 2). 
The constitutional state is supposed to ensure that different communities 
of belief can coexist peacefully on the basis of equal rights and mutual tolerance. 
These problems should be approached from the perspective of egalitarian universal-
ism, which orients civic solidarity toward a solidarity among “others”, universalistic 
constitutional principles and human rights (Habermas, 2008, p. 290). Mutual rec-
ognition implies that religious and secular citizens are willing to listen and to learn 
from each other in public debates. The political virtue of treating each other civilly 
cannot be prescribed, but can only be learned. The “politics of recognition” can-
not be implemented through the legal medium, if mentalities remain unchanged. 
Habermas emphasizes that the mutual recognition of the equal status of all mem-
bers requires a transformation of interpersonal relations through communicative 
action and discourse and ultimately by way of public debates over identity politics.
The concept of autonomy, including the liberties of citizens vis-à-vis the state 
and third parties, is challenged by fundamentalism – Islamic, Christian, Jewish, etc. 
In drawing on Kant’s concept of autonomy as the capacity to bind one’s own will 
by normative insights that result from public use of reason, Habermas explains that 
citizens are autonomous when they give themselves their laws. This idea of self-
legislation is implemented, for example, in the model of a constitutional assembly 
which establishes basic rights. It is also underpinning the procedure of democratic 
will-formation that establishes political authority “on a mode of legitimation that 
is neutral toward worldviews”. As a result, “a religious or metaphysical justification 
of human rights becomes superfluous”. The political autonomy of citizens implies 
“a secularized political authority uncoupled from religious or cosmological world-
views” (Habermas 2001, p. 127). This mode of legitimation grants equal rights to all 
citizens regardless of their beliefs. In contrast, fundamentalists insist that their own 
truth claim is absolute and should be enforced by political power. This leads to an 
exclusive character of polity, and thus legitimations based on this kind of religious 
worldviews “are incompatible with the inclusion of equally entitled non-believers 
or persons of other persuasions” (Habermas 2001, p. 127). 
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However, the secular legitimation faces challenge not only from fundamental-
ists, but also from intellectuals who are skeptical about official politics of neutrality 
of the state regarding worldviews and, as in the case of Islamic and Hindu religious 
cultures, who rely more on their mutual toleration and cross-fertilization. Habermas 
emphasizes that toleration doesn’t mean to compromise the authenticity and truth 
claims of religions, but rather it enables their “equally entitled coexistence” within 
the community. The conflict of cultures in a globalized world requires that peoples, 
regardless of their cultural and religious differences, agree on norms of coexistence. 
He notices the growing awareness that one’s own religious truths must conform 
to publicly recognized secular knowledge and be defended in the same universe of 
discourse. He views in this tendency toward what Rawls described as “an ethical 
worldview and self-understanding that has become reflexive, open to reasonable 
disagreement with other belief system, but also able to reach an understanding 
with them on the rules of equal coexistence” (Habermas, 2001, p. 128).
Intercultural dialogue is essential for justifying and interpreting human rights. 
It is alternative to solipsistic reflection in solitude on one’s own worldview and culture 
attempting to unilaterally identify the norms that can be justly universalized. Habermas 
elaborates on a deliberative framework for intercultural dialogue to determine the 
content of human rights. There is a need for philosophical reflection on the herme-
neutic situation of the participants in the debate and their presuppositions. Engaging 
in intercultural dialogue requires participants from different cultural backgrounds to 
seek mutual understanding. According to Habermas, the discussions on human rights 
among representatives of different cultures confirm the normative contents of the 
tacit presuppositions of any discourse whose goal is mutual understanding. They are 
aware that a consensus based on conviction can be reached only under conditions of 
symmetrical relations among them – “relations of mutual recognition, mutual role-
taking, a shared willingness to consider one’s own traditions with the eyes of the 
stranger and to learn from one another” (Habermas, 2001, p. 129).
But the relations between the rich “center” and the poor “periphery” of the 
world system are far from being symmetrical: the nations that concentrate power 
and wealth also dictate the terms of the normative structure of global society. They 
also have a record of misusing the universal language of human rights for nefarious 
purposes. Therefore striving for a more symmetrical dialogue on human rights also 
implies the necessity of more symmetry in economical and political relations, of 
abandoning hegemonic unilateralism and establishing the multilateral cooperation 
among sovereign nations as equals.
Human Rights and an Ethical Discourse 
in Latin American Philosophy
Human rights are one of the central themes underpinning Latin American phi-
losophy, and expressed in many ways both directly and indirectly. The human rights 
problem is related to the other themes, such as the philosophical identity of Latin 
America, the conceptual liberation of its thought, as well as social and human libera-
tion. It serves as the basis for an ethical-political critique of the “human condition” and 
the policies of human rights in the context of the “exclusive globalization”, economic 
polarization, ecological crisis and other regional and global problems which affect 
the lives of millions. Enrique Dussel, Arturo Roig, Raúl Fornet-Betancourt and other 
Latin American philosophers, in dialogue with the philosophers of other countries, 
contribute to the search of a universally valid ethics as a rationally grounded norma-
tive base for the solution to the social and global problems.
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An Argentinian philosopher Arturo Andres Roig contributes to the philo-
sophical grounding of human rights through elaborating on the concepts of human 
dignity and the “emerging morality”. He himself witnessed human rights violations 
during the military dictatorship in Argentina (1976-1983) and was among the many 
philosophers forced into exile, and he analyses the problem of human rights in Latin 
America. He observes in society since 1983 self-critical moral reflection and “an 
explosion of moral consciousness” mainly due in part to the Association of Human 
Rights and first of all of the Mothers of May Square. Unfortunately, since 1983 the 
process of the restoration of democracy still didn’t lead toward the establishment of 
the rule of law, but rather a situation of “the state of impunity”, indulgent toward 
those who committed atrocities, in which the government ignores requests for jus-
tice coming from human rights organizations. Although the laws which bestowed 
an indulgence to the militaries sentenced by the [tribunal] courts of justice, looked 
legal, nevertheless they were intrinsically antijuridical and immoral. These laws were 
justified ideologically by the doctrine of the “two demons”, which declared guilty 
both the perpetrators of repressions and those who were repressed, i.e., the execu-
tioners and their victims. This ideology represents “the ethics of power” (Roig, 2000).
 Roig elaborates on the concept of the “emerging morality” (la moral emer-
gente). He distinguishes between the ethicalness (eticidad) as objective morality 
and morality (moralidad) as subjective morality. The ethicalness or the “ethics of 
power” is associated with the State and a “rational egoism” and is frequently used 
as means for control and oppression. In contrast, the subjective morality expresses 
the individual’s needs and is related to the resistance against domination and to 
protest movements, and it is philosophically expressed in the tradition of “the 
principled humanism” (el humanismo principista). Within this tradition of liberation 
and humanistic thought an alternative “emerging morality” arises. Roig traces the 
emerging morality to the moral-philosophical ideas of Juan Bautista Alberdi, Eugenio 
Maria de Hostos and Jos Mart en Latin America, as well as to Kant’s theory of the 
categorical imperative and his ideal of the cosmopolitan humanity. 
Roig points out as a remarkable phenomenon of our time a new return to-
ward Kant, related to his Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1964) and especially to the 
validity and meaning of the theory of the categorical imperative. As an analogy to 
the Kantian logical-formal or epistemological a priori, Roig postulates an “anthro-
pological a priori” of the subject as a philosophical principle. It refers to an empiri-
cal subject whose temporality is founded not in the consciousness or a concept, 
but rather in the historicity as a capacity of each human being to shape one’s own 
life, to be “an actor and an author of one’s own history” (Roig, 1981, p. 12, 15). 
In certain sense it resonates with Kantian concept of an individual’s right to be au-
tonomous, independent, and one’s own master. The anthropologic a priori implies 
self-recognition and the recognition of others. In order to be a truly genuine human 
being, it is necessary for one to accept the dignity of the others and to view them 
as valuable. This is possible only if one recognizes oneself and others as the ends 
in themselves. Roig rejects the subordination of the subjectivity to the objectivity. 
He emphasizes the collective dimension of the anthropologic a priori, namely that 
the subjective is not merely reduced to a singular individual, but includes also the 
relationship with the others. Philosophy, which starts with the self-affirmation of a 
subject as valuable for oneself, further broadens its social function in contributing 
to the regaining people’s self-consciousness, as the collective recognition of “us” 
by ourselves as valuable (Roig, 1981, p. 14-15)
Among the various aspects of the new return to Kant, the Argentinian philoso-
pher emphasizes two of them: First is Kant’s clear distinction between morality and 
legality. This is in contrast to their confusion in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Hegel, 
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1952), in which the ethicalness ends up absorbing all the subjectivity, adducing the 
universality to the ethicalness and irremediable particularity to the subjectivity. In 
contrast to Hegel’s statement that subjective morality should subordinate itself to 
objective ethics, Roig criticizes “the ethics of power” and supports “the morality of 
protest”. The “emerging morality” manifests itself precisely through the complex 
history inseparable from the social struggles, and in an ongoing conflict with the 
ideological “universal” as the basis of the ethics of power (Roig, 1997, p. 12-13). 
The second aspect of the return to Kant is Kantian formalism. Hegel claimed 
that Kant’s version of a rational principle, the categorical imperative, was so formal 
and devoid of content that it could not coherently guide the appropriate actions. 
Critics of ethical formalism equate it with lack of content or with emptiness, thus 
nullifying the theory of the categorical imperative. But in transcendental ethics, 
“formal” means universal claims proved and formed by reason. According to tran-
scendental philosophy, the form could be only that which carries the quality of 
universality and is of a general significance for everybody. Universal form does not 
exclude variety of content. For example, a legal right as a form is a universal and 
equal guarantee, clearly fixed by the law. Within this space, a variety of opportunities 
and individualities can be realized. Research shows that two normative contents are 
proved by the method of transcendental formalism. One is: do not commit decep-
tion (lie, defraud, betray, perjure, or break a promise or agreement). The other is 
stated in the second formulation of the categorical imperative, or the principle of 
dignity, which prescribes as a strict duty not to violate the dignity of persons as ra-
tional agents (Kant, 1964, p. 96). This entails a prohibition against treating another 
person as a “thing”, or as a servant for the master’s will, and a prohibition against 
imposing our belief, will, and goal on another. These prohibitions imply the idea 
of individual autonomy as an inalienable right. An autonomous will must be one 
that is free, being a cornerstone of a sense of justice. Kant emphasized the ethical 
norms because he understood the negative consequences of their violation, and 
in his concern he was prophetic. In our time we witness the oppression of human 
dignity originating in alienation and objectification of human activity, as well as 
ideological manipulation and control over the individual’s way of thinking. That is 
why we so treasure the values of freedom and human rights.
As Roig points out, Kantian formalism was not so formal as its critics may 
think, and that it presupposes a certain content. The value of human dignity is the 
value which gives content to the Kantian formalism. Roig, in referring to the second 
formulation of the categorical imperative, calls it “revolutionary”: in Kant’s time 
it was a manifestation of the “emergence” of a new consciousness and of waking 
up new social classes during Modernity, and it continues playing its role in defend-
ing human dignity against oppression. This formulation, the principle of dignity, 
requires a transformation of values, particularly considering our societies in which 
an instrumental use not merely of reason but also of human beings became law 
for those practicing “rational egoism” (Roig, 1997, p. 13). Thus this formulation 
implies the dissidence, resistance, and affirmation of change (alteridad) (Roig, 1994, 
p. 174). This moral philosophy is akin to what is demonstrated by the “emerging 
morals” of peoples. Roig argues that human dignity is closely related to necessities: 
first because dignity needs a human being in order to realize its own humanity, and 
then the dignity implies not only the necessities in general, but also the modes of 
their satisfaction (Roig, 1997, p. 14). Emerging morality affirms its own principles, 
and in it dignity is the first necessity (Roig, 1994, p. 178-179).
Arturo Roig develops the concept of the “emerging morality” as an alterna-
tive to the dominant ethicalness associated with technocratic rational egoism and 
neoliberal globalization. The emergent morality serves for the grounding of the 
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principles related to the category of human dignity. Human dignity is negated by 
the neoliberal and neoconservative “discourse of necessities”, which follows the 
“forms of satisfaction” typical for a consumerist society (Roig, 1994, p. 180). As a 
contrast, for most of the Third World population, necessities are related to survival. 
In criticizing neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies, including Francis Fukuyama’s 
conception of “the end of history” as the apology of the status quo, Roig states 
that the Latin American people do not want to “close history”, but rather they want 
to improve their lives for the best and that liberation remains their purpose (Roig, 
1993, p. 212).
 Roig asserts that from the Latin American perspective, “the Enlightenment 
ideal of the cosmopolitan humanity of which Kant was dreaming in his time didn’t 
vanish” (Roig, 1994 p. 183-184). Within the Latin American emerging morality the 
“cosmopolis” served as the ideal. Cosmopolitanism expresses a universality which is 
dialectically related with “our homelands, their peoples and their worlds”. As Roig 
writes, these regulative ideas are not foreign but rather “express anthropological a 
priori and affirmation of ourselves as valuable, and at the same time they express 
our moral conviction which impels us toward a recognition of the human dignity” 
(Roig, 1994, p. 184).
Enrique Dussel contributes to a moral justification for the concept of human 
rights through elaborating on the “ethics of liberation” (1998). He analyzes the 
problematic of ethics in its foundation. He makes a critical analysis of existing ethical 
theories as representing the different types of grounding ethics. One is a “formal 
morality,” developed by Kant and discourse ethics (with the principle of discursive 
validity). The other is “material ethics”, expressed in various ways by Aristotle, Max 
Scheler, and more recently, Alasdair MacIntyre (with the universal material principle 
or practical truth). Dussel also analyzes “the universal principle of ethical feasibil-
ity”, related to the possibility of obtaining the “good”. He reviews them from the 
perspective of liberation ethics. 
Dussel creatively develops Apel’s discourse ethics, articulating a new level of 
architectonic distinctions. In addition to the distinction between Parts A (univer-
sality) and B (particularity) of discourse ethics, Dussel introduces a third “level C”, 
namely “singularity”. Thus, the “good”, or an act with a goodness claim is neither 
merely the universality of principles nor the particularity of their mediations, but 
rather a concrete synthesis of the practical true-valid-possible. Liberation ethics is 
life-enhancing: the reproduction and growth of human life is the main criterion of 
truth (theoretical and practical), since it is the absolute condition of the possibility 
of human existence (Dussel, 1998, p. 140, 568). This criterion is internal to each 
culture and allows it to establish a dialogue from the universality of the value of 
human life. Liberation ethics provides a conceptual framework for addressing the 
issues of underdevelopment and other global problems. 
The Latin American philosophers place the human being in the center of 
their analysis and considered as a criterion of judgment for the positive or negative 
effects of globalization. Arturo Roig, Enrique Dussel, and Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, 
among others, expand the moral concepts of human dignity and justice to the 
legal concept of human rights. They address the problem of human rights from 
the Latin American perspective, as well as from the perspective of the African and 
Asian countries in which the peoples suffer from the double yoke of political repres-
sions and poverty. They assert the concept of human rights as a whole complex of 
political, social, and economic rights which would guarantee a decent human life 
for everybody in the planet.
The solution to the social and global problems, which threaten the future of 
humanity, requires a new mentality and a new political culture based on respect 
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for human rights, sovereign equality, dialogue, and collaboration. The ideas of the 
meta-ethics of humanity developed by the Latin American and other contemporary 
philosophers, serve as the philosophical framework for the discussions about these 
issues. Their search for the foundation of a universally valid ethics is in keeping with 
the quest for a rationally grounded universal normative base for the solution to 
contemporary world problems.
“Imperial” Versus Dialogical Cosmopolitanism
Many philosophers writing on human rights are viewed them within a cos-
mopolitan perspective: Karl-Otto Apel, Stephen Anthony Appiah, Daniele Archibugi, 
Kenneth Baynes, Ulrich Beck., Seyla Benhabib, James Bohman, Judith Butler, Jacques 
Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, David Held (2005), Walter Mignolo, Martha Nussbaum, 
and Amartya Sen, among others. Contemporary cosmopolitanism tends to be 
responsive to diversity and power relations in today’s global conditions. Amid the 
diversity of voices in the current debate on the philosophy of cosmopolitanism, 
two main tendencies can be identified: one toward an emphasis on identification 
with humanity as a whole and world-citizenship and the other toward an empha-
sis on the protection of the cultural diversity of nations and minority groups. To 
the “imperial” version of cosmopolitanism these philosophers oppose critical and 
dialogical cosmopolitanism. There is also a difference between more centered and 
more decentered models of legal and political cosmopolitanism. The discourse on 
cosmopolitanism helps to clarify some of its own normative claims, at the core of 
which is the dialectic of difference and identity, otherness and sameness. These 
philosophers elaborate a version of cosmopolitanism that is democratic, grounded, 
enlightened, reflexive, and dialogical. Dialogical cosmopolitanism “expands both 
vertically and horizontally, through local cosmopolitan iterations that defer it mak-
ing it into a normative ideal that is guided by contextual universalism” (Mendieta, 
2009, p. 255). Yet for all of these cosmopolitan philosophers, Kant serves as a source 
of inspiration in the search for solutions to today’s problems. And while most of 
them believe that Kant’s theory needs substantial modification, they all insist that 
it continues to possess normative relevance.
For example, David Held refers to Kant in sketching an idea of a “new cosmo-
politanism” and what he calls “the cosmopolitan model of democracy”. He points 
out that solutions to social and global problems require “the recovery of an intensive 
and participatory democracy” at local levels and the development of transnational 
grass-roots movements with regional and global objectives, such as protection of 
human rights, of the environment, and the alleviation of disease. Held argues that 
we can specify a set of principles that express the idea of each person’s having 
equal moral significance. He identifies eight of these principles: equal worth and 
dignity; active agency; personal responsibility and accountability; consent; collective 
decision-making about public matters; inclusiveness and subsidiarity; avoidance 
of serious harm; and sustainability. Due to a hermeneutic complexity in moral and 
political affairs, while these principles are universal in scope, they are interpreted 
in local contexts in situated discussion. He termed this a “layered cosmopolitan 
perspective” (Held, 2005, p. 18).
Similar to Apel, Habermas, and other theorists of discourse ethics, Seyla Ben-
habib develops her concept in relation to Kantian thought and the ideas of freedom, 
autonomy, and cosmopolitan order, rethinking them in a contemporary context. In 
referring to the Kantian “principle of right,” Benhabib writes that it establishes how 
a juridico-civil order, which would be in compliance with the moral law of respect to 
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the freedom of each, can emerge. Its features are generality, formal reciprocity, and 
equality. Thus a polity based on the principle of rights respects each individual as a 
moral being (Benhabib, 2011, p. 67). Benhabib is rethinking Kant from a dialogical 
discursive perspective and the idea of communicative freedom. In a justification 
of the principle of right, instead of reflecting on what each individual could will 
to be universal law for all, discourse ethics is focused on which norms could be 
considered valid by all those who would be affected as participants in discursive 
moral argumentations. 
Benhabib’s basic assumption is that all human beings are capable of “com-
municative freedom”. This implies a basic moral right: as a moral being capable 
of communicative freedom each individual has a fundamental right to have rights 
(Benhabib, 2011, p. 68). This basic moral right is connected to a broader set of hu-
man rights. One has a “right”, that is, a moral claim to be recognized by others as 
“a right-bearing person”, entitled to a legally instituted schedule of rights. Benhabib 
extends her concept of democratic iterations beyond societies toward an interna-
tional arena: “The interlocking of democratic iteration struggles within a global civil 
society and the creation of solidarities beyond borders, including a universal right 
of hospitality that recognizes the other as a potential cocitizen, anticipate another 
cosmopolitanism–a cosmopolitanism to come” (Benhabib, 2006, p. 177).
In conclusion, theorists whose work embodied a cosmopolitan perspective 
represent a heuristically fruitful approach to the problem of human rights. They 
endorse the constitutionalization of international law (with a pluralist understanding 
of constitutionalism) and the strengthening of international institutions, such as a 
properly reformed United Nations, as well as transnational democratic movements 
as vehicles for the realization of a cosmopolitan order. The analysis shows that the 
true solution to the problem o f protecting human rights can be achieved only by 
peaceful means, based on strengthening international law and institutions and aim-
ing for a gradual realization of the ideal of cosmopolitan order of law and peace.
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